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Imagine: it is January 20, 1961. John Kennedy has just given his inaugural 
address. Idealism reigns. Optimism abounds. The world is changing. A new 
generation is assuming the mantle of leadership. Kennedy would put us on a path 
to the moon and solve entrenched problems, most notably de jure discrimination 
against African Americans in much of the country. 
The Warren Court was prepared to assist. Warren, Douglas, Black, Clark, and 
Brennan are in Warren’s office. He has a text of the president’s speech, and he 
reads from it: we must “undo the heavy burdens . . . [and] let the oppressed go 
free.”1 
The justices ask themselves what the Court could do to ease the heavy burdens 
individuals bear when caught up in the American criminal justice system. There is 
little doubt that many state systems in the 1950s were fundamentally unfair to 
 
*  Rutgers Board of Governors Professor of Law, Judge Alexander P. Waugh, Sr. Distinguished Scholar. 
For comments on earlier drafts, I thank Joshua Dressler, Dan Medwed, Annabel Pollioni, and the audience at the 
Warren Court’s Criminal Procedure Revolution: A 50-year Retrospective, held at McGeorge Law School, 
October 11, 2019. For excellent research assistance and editing, I thank Sawyer Like and the board of editors at 
The University of the Pacific Law Review. I am also thankful for the wonderful friendship of many years that 
Joshua and I have enjoyed. 
1.  See John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Inaugural Address (20 January 1961), VOICES OF DEMOCRACY: THE U.S. 
ORATORY PROJECT, http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/kennedy-inaugural-address-speech-text (last visited Apr. 
4, 2020) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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suspects and defendants, particularly the vast majority who were indigent. Having 
mustered a unanimous Court for Brown v. Board of Education,2 Warren would 
undoubtedly have thought he could muster a majority to effect needed changes in 
state criminal justice systems. 
In that imaginary meeting, Chief Justice Warren would look at the state of 
criminal “justice” in 1961. What would the former prosecutor see? Police in half 
the states can conduct unreasonable searches and seizures without fear of losing 
evidence because Wolf v. Colorado3 refused to require states to apply the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule. Police in all fifty states are free to conduct 
relentless interrogation and deny requests for counsel, as long as the police stay 
within the spacious confines of the common law voluntariness norm.4 Fifteen 
states do not provide lawyers for indigent felony defendants,5 and the Due Process 
Clause is not violated unless defendants can show special circumstances that 
require appointment of counsel.6 The result in most cases is a charade of a process 
where the defendant has no expert legal advice. Moreover, prosecutors have no 
duty to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense. Earl Warren would have 
concluded that the Due Process Clause, as the Court had interpreted it, permitted 
states to impose the worst of all worlds on defendants—lay defendants, who might 
be innocent, forced to defend alone against experienced prosecutors aided with 
evidence obtained by questionable police methods. 
Warren might have asked himself: Can we remedy those problems and bring 
the recalcitrant states in line? They tried. 
But largely failed, I will argue. The Warren Court solutions were doomed to 
failure, not because of Richard Nixon and his Court appointments, but because of 
two flawed assumptions. First was the Court’s understanding of human nature. 
Partaking of Kennedy’s optimism, the Warren Court thought that if it led, state 
police, prosecutors, legislatures, and courts would follow even when they would 
have preferred not to follow. It was not to be. 
A related failure was the lack of understanding that criminal justice systems 
are self-adjusting and tend toward crime control; take away one method of 
efficiently solving and prosecuting crimes, and the system finds another way. 
I wish to be clear. I am not saying the Warren Court made a mistake in deciding 
its landmark criminal procedure cases. They stand as an enduring testament to the 
American commitment to fairness, equality, and compassion. They probably, at 
the margin, improved the lot of those who suffered the heavy burdens of our 1950s 
state criminal justice systems. My claim is more modest: The criminal procedure 
“revolution” was more revolutionary in what it promised than in what it delivered. 
The “system” adjusted to the “revolution” in various ways, some obvious—the 
 
2.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3.  338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
4.  See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). 
5.  McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 120 (1961) (appendix to opinion of Douglas, J., concurring). 
6.  See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
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refusal of most state legislatures to provide adequate funding for indigent 
defense7—and some not so obvious—the creation of more and more draconian 
criminal penalties.8 And, a President Humphrey would not, in my judgment, have 
made a difference in the long run. Both of the Warren Court’s failed assumptions 
would have played out the same way. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REMEDY TRAP 
The Court noted probable jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the state court in 
Mapp v. Ohio in the fall of 1960,9 weeks before Kennedy was elected. The case 
was briefed and argued, principally on the ground that the First Amendment 
protects possession of obscenity in one’s home.10 After the conference on the case, 
five justices decided to make it a vehicle to overrule Wolf and force the states to 
apply the exclusionary rule.11 Conventional wisdom is that the Court switched 
theories because it was the perfect case to overrule Wolf. The Court would not be 
letting a rapist or murderer go free but merely someone who possessed mildly 
pornographic material.12 
Yes of course, but that begs the question of why the Court thought it advisable 
to overrule Wolf a mere twelve years after it was decided by a 6-3 vote. That, I 
submit, is perhaps best explained as the first shot out of the cannon designed to 
“undo the heavy burdens” placed on defendants in states that did not apply the 
exclusionary rule. Whether the Court would have reached out to overrule Wolf if 
Kennedy had not won the presidency, or merely decided the First Amendment 
issue it would decide later in Stanley v. Georgia,13 is of course unknowable. 
Following Wolf, some police took flagrant advantage of the “open door” to 
admission in states that did not utilize the exclusionary rule. In Rochin v. 
California, three deputy sheriffs broke into Rochin’s bedroom without a warrant 
or consent.14 When he tried to swallow some capsules he grabbed from his bedside 
table, three officers “jumped upon him” and attempted to extract the capsules from 
his mouth.15 When they failed to keep Rochin from swallowing the capsules, the 
officers handcuffed him and took him to a hospital where his stomach was 
 
7.  See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 
HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045–46 (2006); Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in 
the Reform of Criminal Justice, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 924 (2013). 
8.  See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 
YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997). 
9.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 364 U.S. 868 (1960) (issuing its opinion on October 24). 
10.  See id. at 673 n.4 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
11.  Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the 
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1367–68 (1983). 
12.  Id. at 1367. 
13.  394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment protects the private possession of obscenity). 
14.  342 U.S. 165, 166–67 (1952). 
15.  Id. 
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“pumped,” and he was forced to vomit.16 The vomit contained residue of morphine. 
He was convicted of possession of morphine and sentenced to sixty days.17 
When Rochin reached the Supreme Court in 1952, the Court found itself in an 
uncomfortable position. The conduct of the state officers was offensive. But, 
would the Court overrule Wolf only three years after it was decided? That was 
surely unappetizing. So, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, who wrote Wolf, the 
Court turned to a pure due process analysis. Due process of law includes not 
treating suspects the way the officers treated Rochin. The methods of the deputy 
sheriffs were “too close to the rack and the screw” to be permissible.18 And what 
standard would courts apply to determine when police violated due process? They 
would look to see whether the state conduct “shocks the conscience.”19 
The Rochin solution suffered two major problems. First, one hopes modern 
police search and seizure techniques rarely approach the rack and the screw, 
meaning that the protection offered by Rochin was much more limited than the 
Fourth Amendment requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable. Second, 
“shock the conscience” has no readily understood definition. Of course, 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” suffers a similar problem with 
indeterminacy, but the Court is stuck with the constitutional text; it does not have 
to offer standards or norms that are also maddeningly vague. 
The indeterminacy problem with “shock the conscience” manifested itself a 
mere two years after Rochin, once again surfacing in a California case. How would 
the physical mistreatment of the suspect in Rochin compare to police putting a 
microphone in the bedroom occupied by husband and wife and monitoring the 
microphone for months? Police in Irvine v. California20 were treated to an audio 
recording of everything that was said and done in that bedroom for months. Shock 
your conscience? Not that of Justice Jackson, who wrote the plurality opinion in 
Irvine. “However obnoxious are the facts in the case before us, they do not involve 
coercion, violence or brutality to the person, but rather a trespass to property, plus 
eavesdropping.”21 Justice Frankfurter, the author of Rochin, dissented. His 
conscience, along with that of Justice Burton, was shocked. “Surely the Court does 
not propose to announce a new absolute, namely, that even the most reprehensible 
means for securing a conviction will not taint a verdict so long as the body of the 
accused was not touched by State officials.”22 
Justice Clark, concurring in the judgment in Irvine, put his finger on the 
problem with the Rochin approach: It “makes for such uncertainty and 
unpredictability that it would be impossible to foretell—other than by 
 
16.  Id. at 166. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. at 172. 
19.  Id. 
20.  347 U.S. 128 (1954). 
21.  Id. at 133. 
22.  Id. at 146 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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guesswork—just how brazen the invasion of the intimate privacies of one's home 
must be in order to shock itself into the protective arms of the Constitution.”23 He 
also pointed the Warren Court’s way out of the mess—to revisit the decision in 
Wolf not to require states to apply the exclusionary rule: “Perhaps strict adherence 
to the tenor of that [Wolf] decision may produce needed converts for its 
extinction.”24 This explains why Clark concurred in the judgment; he wanted to 
hold the Court’s feet to the Wolf fire. 
And nine years later, Wolf was indeed extinguished in an opinion by Justice 
Clark. In Mapp v. Ohio,25 Clark had the bare minimum of votes he needed to 
overrule Wolf and make Rochin largely irrelevant.26 The tenor of the Mapp opinion 
was that the Court had finally solved the indeterminacy problem of Wolf-Rochin-
Irvine. 
 
Today we once again examine Wolf's constitutional 
documentation of the right to privacy free from unreasonable state 
intrusion, and, after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to 
close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured 
by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic [Fourth 
Amendment] right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee 
against that very same unlawful conduct.27 
 
Case closed. State and federal courts would apply the exclusionary rule. Did 
the police violate the Fourth Amendment when conducting a search for and seizure 
of item X? If so, X is inadmissible in state or federal court. 
Of course, suppressing X is an easy judicial chore when, as in Mapp, X consists 
of four mildly pornographic books and a hand-drawn obscene picture.28 It is a 
much more unpleasant task when the challenged evidence proves a murder, a rape, 
or an armed robbery. 1960s idealism might have suggested courts would follow 
the Court’s lead and apply the exclusion remedy without “peeking” through to see 
what kind of crime is being prosecuted. But, that was not to be the case. 
The discretion that Wolf left state courts as to remedy, and that Mapp removed, 
quickly resurfaced when courts considered what is a reasonable search and seizure 
and what exceptions it should make to the exclusion remedy. As to exceptions to 
exclusion, a defendant convicted of a brutal murder asked the courts to reverse his 
conviction on the ground that the police officer used the wrong search warrant 
 
23.  Id. at 138 (Clark, J., concurring in judgment). 
24.  Id. at 139. 
25.  367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
26.  Rochin still applies in situations where the Fourth Amendment is not violated. In Hernandez v. State, 
548 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1977), for example, the police could rely on an exigent circumstance 
exception to the Fourth Amendment, but Rochin was nonetheless available to argue for exclusion.  
27.  Id. at 655–56. 
28.  Stewart, supra note 11, at 1367. 
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form.29 Because of the form error, the warrant authorized a search for controlled 
substances but not for evidence of a murder. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the search of the defendant’s home could not be authorized by the 
warrant, and therefore the evidence of the murder had to be suppressed. The 
murder conviction was reversed. The United States Supreme Court declined to 
follow the state court, instead applying its newly-created good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule.30 Letting Ms. Mapp walk free is a very different judicial 
chore than letting a murderer walk. A murder defendant’s conviction stood despite 
the Fourth Amendment violation. The Court now recognizes good faith exceptions 
to the exclusionary rule for searches based on a search warrant even though the 
officer violated the requirement of “knock and announce”;31 for arrests based on a 
statute later held unconstitutional;32 for arrests based on a doctrine later 
overruled;33 for arrests on insufficient cause if there was an arrest warrant 
outstanding even though the officer did not know about the warrant;34 for arrests 
based on a warrant that a judicial employee mistakenly told the officer was 
outstanding;35 and for arrests based on a warrant that a police employee mistakenly 
told the officer was outstanding.36 Plenty of good faith to go around and lots of 
evidence introduced! 
James Spiotto’s 1973 study contains empirical evidence suggesting that judges 
“bend” the Fourth Amendment in cases of serious crimes.37 Spiotto found that, in 
cases of violent, serious felonies, Chicago judges granted 8% of motions to 
suppress while 82% were successful in narcotics and gambling cases.38 To be sure, 
there are confounding variables. Police are surely more careful to obey the Fourth 
Amendment in murder, rape, and robbery cases because the consequence of losing 
evidence is more serious. And, evidence is usually harder to obtain in drug cases, 
leading police to take more Fourth Amendment risks in these, typically minor, 
cases. Still, a difference as stark as the one Spiotto found suggests that courts will 
“bend” the Fourth Amendment to permit a search for truth when a dangerous 
criminal might otherwise go free. And Spiotto’s study was before the Court created 
the various good-faith exceptions to exclusion. Courts now have more tools to 
 
29.  Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987 (1984); accord United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984). 
30.  See Leon, 468 U.S. at 897. 
31.  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___ (2016) (describing the doctrine 
as “attenuation of the taint” of the unlawful entry). 
32.  Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
33.  Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011). 
34.  Strieff, 579 U.S. (describing the doctrine as “attenuation of the taint” of the unlawful arrest). 
35.  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
36.  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
37.  James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its 
Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973). 
38.  In murder, rape, and robbery cases, a total of 49 motions to suppress were made; only 4 were successful, 
a rate of 8%. In narcotics and gambling cases, 1,149 motions to suppress were made; 941 were successful, a 
success rate of 82%. See id. at 250, tbl. 2.  
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permit them to avoid exclusion. 
Consider the seven years and three trials it took to send Robert Reldan to prison 
for life.39 Within a period of ten days in October 1975, two young New Jersey 
women disappeared.40 Their naked bodies were found thirteen miles apart later that 
month. State police and the FBI had reason to suspect Reldan, a sex offender 
recently paroled from prison.41 After Reldan came to authorities’ attention as a 
suspect in the murders, they developed probable cause to believe he had broken 
into two houses and stolen property, fleeing the scene in a particular automobile. 
Police arrested Reldan for the break-ins and impounded his car. They got a 
search warrant to search the car for evidence of the break-ins, “including, but not 
limited to, fingerprints, implements used to commit the break and entries, stolen 
property listed on the attached sheet and anything else of evidentiary value that a 
complete and thorough search might disclose.” The attached sheet “listed 
numerous items of jewelry and other personal property.”42 The FBI assisted with 
the execution of the warrant, which included vacuuming the car’s interior. Hairs 
and other minute particles seized from the car were examined microscopically by 
the FBI, producing forensic evidence used to link Reldan to the murders. 
Prior to his first trial for the two murders, Reldan made a Fourth Amendment 
motion to suppress the forensic evidence on the ground that vacuuming the car and 
examining the contents with microscopes exceeded the scope of a warrant 
ostensibly designed to permit a search for evidence of break-ins.43 The trial judge 
agreed and ordered the evidence suppressed; the State did not appeal that ruling.44 
Without forensic evidence, the State’s case was, evidently, not terribly strong, and 
the jury could not reach a verdict.45 For the second trial, the State improved its case 
by introducing evidence that Reldan had prior convictions for similar crimes 
against women who survived the attacks. The judge admitted the other crimes 
evidence to show identity and not as evidence that Reldan committed the murders. 
The judge gave a limiting instruction to the jury, but the jury convicted. It is 
difficult to disagree with the appellate court that admission of the other crimes 
evidence was highly prejudicial: “The intrusion of the evidence of these prior 
crimes into this trial clearly had the high potential for prejudice recognized in our 
cases . . . .”46 The appellate court reversed Reldan’s murder convictions. 
One sees the State’s predicament. The prosecution could not win at trial 
number one without the prior crimes evidence and now it cannot introduce that 
evidence at trial number three. The State obviously believed Reldan was the 
 
39.  See State v. Reldan, 495 A.2d. 76 (N.J. 1985); State v. Reldan, 449 A.2d. 1317 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1982). 
40.  Reldan, 495 A.2d at 79. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. at 80. 
43.  Id.  
44.  Id. at 85. 
45.  Id. at 78. 
46.  State v. Reldan, 449 A.2d. 1317, 1323 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982). 
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murderer, meaning that the prosecution had to find a third way. And it did. “In 
anticipation of the third trial, the State moved before the trial court for a 
reconsideration of the May 1979 suppression order.”47 The trial court agreed “that 
a new hearing on the suppression issue was warranted.” One wonders why. The 
“law of the case” should have foreclosed reconsideration of a motion that the State 
lost and did not appeal. The trial court once again suppressed the evidence 
“because ‘the execution of the warrant went beyond its scope’ and there were no 
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search.”48 The State appealed the 
trial court’s ruling on an interlocutory basis. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that the Fourth 
Amendment permitted use of the forensic evidence at trial number three. The court 
held the search was within the scope of the warrant on the somewhat tenuous 
ground that a microscopic search might uncover “soil particles, debris, paint chips 
and the like” related to the break-in.49 But how does a warrant that does not 
mention those items satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant 
must “particular[] describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized”?50 
No, the real reason the majority allowed the prosecution to introduce the 
forensic evidence becomes plain in the part of the opinion rejecting the defendant’s 
“law of the case” argument. The underlying “law of the case” principle, as 
described by Justice Holmes, is the “practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen 
what has been decided” in a particular case.51 But as the state court concluded, a 
court can refuse to apply the “law of the case” principle by showing that deciding 
the issue differently would on balance produce more good than harm. The state 
supreme court tipped its hand when it noted that “a great deal could be lost in terms 
of the search for truth through the suppression of otherwise reliable evidence if 
reconsideration [of the suppression issue] were to be foreclosed” in Reldan’s 
case.52 Translated: the State needs this evidence to convict a murderer. And in trial 
number three he was convicted and sentenced to life for one murder, and thirty 
years for the other.53 
Even with the powerful hydraulic of not freeing a murderer operating in the 
State’s favor, two justices dissented. Justice O’Hern began the dissent this way: 
 
In the circumstances of this case, after six years and two trials, we 
should not reverse a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence. I recognize that the law of the case doctrine is not an 
 
47.  Reldan, 495 A.2d at 79. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. at 81. 
50.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
51.  Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). 
52.  Reldan, 495 A.2d at 87. 
53.  Telephone conversation with Criminal Court Clerk, Bergen County, N.J. (Sept. 21, 2003) (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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inexorable mandate to such a conclusion. Still I believe, as does 
the majority, that the doctrine expresses public policy concerns 
that should guide a court’s discretion. We differ on the application 
of those policies to the case.54 
 
In almost every case involving a Fourth Amendment violation, admitting 
physical evidence seized from the defendant would serve the truth. Prior to Mapp, 
states could promote the search for truth by not applying the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule. After Mapp, that was no longer a choice. But has all that much 
changed? If evidence is needed to convict a murderer, a court can simply interpret 
the Fourth Amendment so that it is not violated or find an exception, such as the 
officer’s good faith. Discretion has shifted from rules affecting all cases to 
discretion in individual cases, but discretion remains. 
Of course, the principal purpose of the Fourth Amendment and its 
handmaiden, the exclusionary rule, is to deter police from running roughshod over 
those suspected of crime. We have no idea how well that works, but there are 
reasons to be skeptical even if we assume police behave in ways that reduce the 
likelihood of exclusion. Mapp told us it was closing the only door remaining open 
to evidence seized by lawless official conduct. Really? Imagine you are a state 
trooper, it is late at night, and you pull a car over for speeding. The driver and 
passengers are young men who appear nervous and you decide to “fish” for 
evidence of crime. If there is a problem with license and registration, you might be 
able to impound the car. An inventory of the trunk will dutifully record the 
recently-fired handgun that had just killed someone. It will be admissible at trial. 
If there are no grounds for impoundment, you can try for consent. “You don’t 
mind if I look around in your car” might work even if the driver/owner knows 
about the gun. We might have to litigate whether “look around in your car” 
includes the trunk, but in a murder case I have little doubt that the State wins that 
question. If that fails, a few questions (what are you doing out so late at night) 
might trigger a response that creates probable cause. The driver might say they 
were returning from a concert at the same time one passenger said they had been 
working late. Probable cause? In a murder case where the State does not have a 
confession, it just might be. And, of course, police can always lie about consent: 
The officer searches the trunk; if he finds nothing, he lets the car go on its way; if 
he finds the handgun, he later testifies that the driver consented. 
If inventory and consent fail, and you decide not to lie, you let the car go. You 
cannot catch all the fish in the lake, but you can catch your limit by the strategies 
outlined above. Is any of this surprising? It should not be as long as you remember 
the first word in “criminal justice system.” When that criminal is a murderer, the 
Spiotto study suggests the door to evidence is open quite wide. 
Now of course it might be that the justices in the Mapp majority were aware 
 
54.  Reldan, 495 A.2d at 87 (O’Hern, dissenting). 
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of the vast discretion that judges have in Fourth Amendment cases—what exactly 
is an unreasonable search and seizure? But, the language in the opinion suggests 
the Court thought it was providing defendants a reasonably clear-cut rule. The 
Court noted that it “has not hesitated to enforce as strictly against the States as it 
does against the Federal Government” the other rights in the Bill of Rights, and it 
intended to enforce the Fourth Amendment the same way.55 The Court said that it 
had “required of federal law officers a strict adherence to [the Fourth Amendment 
and its exclusionary rule] which this Court has held to be a clear, specific and 
constitutionally required” remedy.56 And the Court now required the same of state 
officers. As noted earlier, the Court said it was closing “the only courtroom door 
remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness.”57 
Moreover, at the time Mapp was decided, the Court’s federal search and 
seizure cases presented a relatively clear-cut set of doctrines. Since 1961, the 
Fourth Amendment doctrine has become more complex, with more doctrines and 
exceptions. Though I cannot prove cause and effect, one potential explanation for 
the current mess of doctrines and exceptions is the reluctance to suppress reliable 
evidence of guilt. 
The Court’s idealism was assuming that police, prosecutors, and judges would 
approach each Fourth Amendment issue as if it were dis-embodied from the crime 
being prosecuted. As James Spiotto observed, what counts as a Fourth Amendment 
violation in a minor drug possession case just might not be a Fourth Amendment 
violation in a murder case. 
Are we to assume that police and prosecutors were ten times more careful in 
those serious, violent crime cases? You are free to do so. I prefer to think that there 
is sufficient play in the Fourth Amendment joints to permit judges to admit 
evidence in most cases if the crime is serious enough. 
Is that a bad development? I’m not sure. But I am relatively sure it is not a 
development the Warren Court anticipated. 
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL MIRAGE 
By 1962, when Arthur Goldberg took the seat of Felix Frankfurter, the Warren 
Court had a solid core of reformers. In addition to Warren and Goldberg, Justices 
Douglas, Brennan, and either Black or Clark, sometimes both, could be counted 
on to seek to expand due process protections for state suspects and defendants. 
Justice Goldberg only served three years but was replaced by the equally reform-
minded Abe Fortas.58 The reformers must have been particularly aghast when they 
contemplated the fifteen states that did not make a routine appointment of counsel 
 
55.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). 
56.  Id. at 648. 
57.  Id. at 654–55. 
58.  Justice Black and Justice Fortas supplied the critical votes to create the narrow five justice majority in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Justice Clark dissented in three of the four Miranda cases. 
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to indigent felony defendants. It is difficult today to believe that Betts v. Brady 
held in 1942 that the Due Process Clause permitted a State to deny counsel to an 
indigent tried for robbery.59 
As Justice Black said for the Court when overruling Betts in Gideon v. 
Wainwright, one of the first major reform cases, “[R]eason and reflection require 
us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled 
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless 
counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.”60 There were 
no dissents.61 The only puzzle is why it took until 1963 to read due process to 
include the right to counsel for indigents in felony cases. Indeed, Justice Douglas 
in a concurring opinion in 1961 had it right: “I cannot believe that a majority of 
the present Court would agree to Betts v. Brady were it here de novo . . . .”62 
Problem solved, right? Uh, no. The solution was not as simple as the Gideon 
Court seemed to think. The Court, of course, cannot order funding for any right 
that it creates. The right to counsel would later expand to include any offense for 
which a defendant serves even a day in jail.63 How would governments provide 
free lawyers to every defendant who faced a realistic prospect of jail time? The 
answer: Not very well. 
A horrendous example of a failing public defender system is the crisis in 
Louisiana. In Vermilion Parish, Louisiana, a public defender office of ten lawyers 
was, in March 2016, reduced to a single lawyer, Natasha George. 64 Ms. George 
handed out applications for defense representation, telling the indigent defendants 
they would be put on a wait list that is “over 2,300 names long and growing.”65 For 
those denied bail, the waiting would be done in jail. In the words of Jay Dixon, the 
chief executive of the Louisiana Public Defender Board, “We have essentially been 
managing a financial collapse.”66 
Here is the noble idea that Gideon expressed: 
 
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed 
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is 
in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national 
constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and 
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before 
 
59.  316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942). 
60.  372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
61.  Id. at 336. Justice Clark concurred in the judgment, id. at 347, though why he did not join Justice 
Black’s opinion for the Court is not made clear in his opinion. 
62.  McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 117 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
63.  See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 357 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
64.  Campbell Robertson, In Louisiana, the Poor Lack Legal Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), 
htttps://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/us/in-louisiana-the-poor-lack-legal-defense.html?ref=todayspaper (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. 
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impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before 
the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man 
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to 
assist him.67 
 
And here is the reality. Mary Sue Backus and Paul Marcus, reporters for the 
National Committee on the Right to Counsel, concluded that indigent defense in 
2009 faced a national crisis: “By every measure in every report analyzing the U.S. 
criminal justice system, the defense function for poor people is drastically 
underfinanced.”68 The underfinancing leads to ineffective assistance of counsel, 
“excessive public defender caseloads and insufficient salaries and compensation 
for defense lawyers.”69 Or as Donald Dripps puts it with his characteristic 
pithiness: “indigent defense is constitutionally required, but only in anemic 
form.”70 
Part of the Warren Court’s idealism that underlies and undermines the right to 
counsel for indigent defendants is the assumption that legislatures would care what 
nine justices said about the need to provide the guiding hand of counsel for indigent 
defendants, most of whom are factually guilty. The very fact that fifteen states did 
not provide indigent felony defendants with counsel prior to Gideon should have 
been a cautionary tale to the reformers who expected Gideon to deliver equal 
justice. 
The standard liberal critique of Gideon’s implementation is that it is all about 
money. More money will solve the problem. But this misses the most fundamental 
Warren Court idealism. The Gideon Court assumed that by pressing one lever or 
two levers, the rest of the criminal justice “machine” remains static. William Stuntz 
articulates the classic critique of this separation into airtight categories: 
 
Most talk about the law of criminal procedure treats that law as a 
self-contained universe. The picture looks something like this: 
The Supreme Court says that suspects and defendants have a right 
to be free from certain types of police or prosecutorial behavior. 
Police and prosecutors, for the most part, then do as they’re told. 
When they don’t, and when the misconduct is tied to criminal 
convictions, the courts reverse the convictions, thereby sending a 
message to misbehaving officials. Within the bounds of this 
picture there is room for a lot of debate . . . . But for all their 
variety, these debates take for granted the same basic picture of 
 
67.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
68.  Backus & Marcus, supra note 7, at 1045. 
69.  Id. at 1045–46; see also NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE 
DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009), available at 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
70.  Dripps, supra note 7, at 924.  
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the process, a process whose only variables are the rules 
themselves and the remedies for their violation. 
 
The picture is, of course, wrong. Criminal procedure’s rules and 
remedies are embedded in a larger system, a system that can adjust 
to those rules in ways other than obeying them.71 
 
Thus, as Dripps has argued, as long as the system permits long sentences, 
multiple overlapping criminal offenses, and no control over plea bargaining, 
prosecutors can achieve the punishment they want almost without regard to the 
quality of defense counsel.72 In his words: “improving indigent defense without 
reining in sentence severity and prosecutorial discretion would do little good. It 
might even do harm if prosecutors respond to the heightened risks of losing trials 
by increasing the trial penalty.”73 
A classic example is Bordenkircher v. Hayes,74 a thoroughly shameful case. 
The State charged Paul Hayes with uttering a forged instrument in the amount of 
$88.30. The prosecutor offered a plea deal of five years and told Hayes and his 
lawyer that if he did not accept the deal, the prosecutor would refile charges under 
the state’s Habitual Criminal Act with its mandatory life sentence.75 The habitual 
offender act applied to Hayes based on two prior convictions that netted him five 
years in the juvenile reformatory and five years on probation.76 In sum, the 
prosecutor threatened a defendant who had never served a day in adult prison with 
a life sentence for a crime worth $88.30 if he did not accept the plea deal of five 
years. Hayes claimed to be innocent of the forged instrument charge and, 
presumably with counsel from his lawyer, refused the plea deal. The prosecutor 
carried through on his threat, and Hayes was convicted of the third felony and 
sentenced to life in prison. 
The Court held, 5-4, that nothing in the Due Process Clause forbade the 
prosecutor from threatening to up the ante to life in prison if Hayes did not accept 
the plea deal. A juvenile offense, an adult felony for which he received probation, 
and uttering a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30 resulted in Paul Hayes 
getting a life sentence. The greatest lawyer in history, Cicero himself, could do 
nothing to prevent the prosecutor from making this threat and could do nothing to 
defend his client if Hayes refused to take the five-year deal. The combination of 
no oversight of plea bargaining and a draconian sentencing structure (repealed not 
long after Hayes was sentenced)77 made the right to counsel essentially 
 
71.  Stuntz, supra note 8, at 3. 
72.  Dripps, supra note 7, at 924. 
73.  Id. at 915. 
74.  434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
75.  Id. at 358–59. 
76.  Id. at 359 n.3. 
77.  Id. at 358 (noting repeal in 1975). To add to Mr. Hayes’s bad luck, he could not have been sentenced 
to life in prison under the revised Kentucky statute. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 42 n.1 (6th Cir. 1976). 
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meaningless. 
The rest of the Paul Hayes story? He received parole after serving five years.78 
It seems the Kentucky parole board thought that the prosecutor’s initial offer was 
the proper measure of punishment. It seems too harsh to me, but it is certainly 
fairer than life in prison. 
Are indigent defendants in the fifteen states that did not provide counsel prior 
to Gideon better off today? The system looks fairer. A defense lawyer stands 
beside the defendant when he pleads guilty or (rarely) goes to trial. But is the plea, 
or the trial, really better for indigent defendants because a lawyer is present for the 
proceedings? Ask Paul Hayes. A true cynic would argue that, as a group, indigent 
defendants receive about the same level of punishment with defense counsel as 
they would receive if the prosecutor had no formal adversary. There is no way to 
test that proposition, but its very plausibility suggests that Gideon has largely been 
a failure. 
III. THE CONFLICTED MINISTER OF JUSTICE 
The Court announced Gideon on March 18, 1963. That day and the next, the 
Court heard argument in a case that, paired with Gideon, scholars once regarded 
as a superhero in the criminal procedure world.79 It was Brady v. Maryland, 
announced two months after Gideon.80 The Brady Court held that “suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective 
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”81 Later cases would essentially 
discard the “upon request” part of Brady, creating what seems at first blush to be 
a broad right for defendants to be given favorable evidence in the hands of the 
prosecution.82 It is not surprising that the Court granted certiorari in Gideon and 
Brady in the same term and decided them within two months of each other. 
Without Gideon, Brady would be largely pointless in the fifteen states that did not 
routinely provide counsel to indigent felony defendants. And without access to 
exculpatory evidence in the hands of the State, the right to counsel would not be 
an effective shield against an unfair or even wrongful conviction. 
Brady appeared in 1963 to be an important protection against the conviction 
of innocent defendants. It was not to be. The reader has already realized that even 
 
78.  He was paroled on December 28, 1978. Letter from Kentucky Department of Corrections to author 
(Dec. 3, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Hayes was convicted of the habitual 
offender charge in April 1973. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (No. 76-
1334), 1977 WL 189700 at *3. Assuming he began his sentence shortly thereafter, the sentence would have been 
roughly five years. 
79.  See Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 
33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643 (2002). 
80.  373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
81.  Id. at 87. 
82.  See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 101 (1976). 
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a robust discovery right is likely to be of little value if the case is one among 
hundreds of felony cases that a public defender has on her desk. But Brady turned 
out to be fragile in its own way. At the same time the Court was removing the 
“upon request” part of Brady, it was defining “material” in a way that made it easy 
for prosecutors to withhold evidence that was favorable but not clear proof of 
innocence. The Court has used multiple locutions for what defendants must show 
to demonstrate a Brady violation. One that is particularly difficult for defendants 
to meet on appeal is to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.”83 Translated: If the defendant cannot show a reasonable 
probability of an acquittal with the withheld evidence, the prosecutor did not 
violate the Due Process Clause. 
As Scott Sundby has pointed out,84 if Brady is limited to evidence that creates 
a reasonable probability of an acquittal, it might not affect many cases. Would 
ethical prosecutors routinely turn over evidence that creates a reasonable doubt 
about guilt and then proceed to trial? One hopes not. Of course, one can imagine a 
case where evidence in the hands of the prosecutor creates a reasonable doubt 
about guilt in the mind of the prosecutor but she believes that the case she will 
present at trial will prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt even if she discloses the 
exculpatory evidence. Those cases are probably not very common. 
However that question is resolved, the real problem is that the decision to turn 
over Brady material is in the hands of the prosecutor. Prosecutors in the American 
system are advocates. In European systems, prosecutors are trained separately and 
typically never practice law as an advocate.85 Their duty is to help reach a just and 
accurate result. In the United States, of course, prosecutors are trained to be 
advocates in law school and then selected from the ranks of those who are 
successful advocates in practice.86 It should not surprise that prosecutors continue 
to be advocates. Yes, they want to convict only the guilty, but as advocates, they 
want to win convictions. That means that prosecutors naturally view evidence 
favorable to defendants in the most pro-prosecution way possible. That is not a 
criticism of prosecutors; it is simply the way advocates think. And, once 
prosecutors view favorable evidence in the most pro-prosecution way possible, that 
reduces the universe of material that prosecutors must disclose to the defense. Dan 
Medwed explores this problem in Prosecution Complex: America’s Race to 
Convict and Its Impact on the Innocent.87 
Another problem with Brady is the black hole problem. When a prosecutor 
does not disclose arguably exculpatory evidence, most defendants will go to prison 
 
83.  Bagley v. United States, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality). 
84.  Sundby, supra note 79, at 661. 
85.  I explore this difference between European and American prosecutors in George C. Thomas III, 
Prosecutors: The Thin Last Line Protecting the Innocent, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA 
REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017). 
86.  See id.  
87.  Id. 
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never knowing of a potential Brady violation. The evidence is, by definition, 
hidden. Perhaps a witness will come forward later, or an open records request will 
dislodge the exculpatory evidence, but one suspects that most defendants never 
learn of the failure to disclose. We really have no way to know the scope of the 
Brady problem. We do know that in a sample of cases from the National Registry 
of Exonerations, 13% of exonerations involve a Brady violation.88 That means that 
in 13% of the convictions of innocent defendants, a court held that the defendant 
met the stringent standard of showing probable innocence, yet the prosecutors 
failed to disclose the evidence. But, we do not know how many undiscovered 
Brady claims are out there, like unexploded ordinance left over from a war. 
Finally, even when a defendant discovers that prosecutors withheld potentially 
favorable evidence, and even if the Court crafted a less pro-prosecution standard 
for review on appeal, there is a hydraulic working against defendants. The only 
remedy is to vacate the conviction and start over; this time, by definition, the 
defendant will have a better shot at an acquittal or hung jury. To be sure, defendants 
who win Brady cases are presumably more likely to be innocent than the garden-
variety defendant who pleads guilty, but courts are still loath to vacate a conviction 
of a probably guilty defendant. 
The Warren Court idealism here is the assumption that prosecutors can put 
aside their training and decades of experience as an advocate-lawyer and suddenly 
become an unbiased minister of justice who looks at the State’s case with skeptical 
eyes. Does that make sense even at a superficial level? The Warren Court idealism 
that undermines Gideon is subtle. But the idealism that sees prosecutors policing 
their files to turn over helpful evidence to defense lawyers so they can mount a 
better defense is almost grotesque. 
A rational system of justice would have an examining magistrate overseeing 
the case and giving the defense what it needs. For example, a defendant in a 
homicide case claimed she was attacked in a motel room by a man with a knife 
and defended herself by turning his knife against him.89 The prosecutor did not 
disclose the victim’s conviction of carrying a deadly weapon and his conviction of 
assault and carrying a deadly weapon.90 Are these convictions relevant to the 
defendant’s claim of self-defense? You bet. Exculpatory? Yes, because they create 
an inference that she is telling the truth about him attacking her. Material under 
Brady? No, the Court held 7-2. The jury heard evidence that the victim was 
wearing a Bowie knife and had another knife in his pocket. His criminal record 
was thus “largely cumulative.”91 Really? It is one thing to carry a knife and another 
for the State to convict of carrying a deadly weapon; we do not know why the State 
charged him with carrying the deadly weapon, but he must have done something 
to call attention to himself. And even if that conviction is cumulative, how can a 
 
88.  Id. at 214. 
89.  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 101 (1976). 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. at 114. 
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conviction of assault and carrying a deadly weapon be cumulative? It is one thing 
to carry a deadly weapon and another to assault someone while carrying a deadly 
weapon. I believe an impartial examining magistrate would disclose both 
convictions to the defense. Ask yourself why the prosecutor did not disclose the 
convictions. It was almost certainly his belief that if the defense could introduce 
those convictions, obtaining a conviction in the homicide case would be less likely. 
The Court never asked itself this rather obvious question. 
One suspects the Brady Court realized that it was asking prosecutors to do the 
impossible. But here, as in Gideon, what choice did the Court have? The Court 
does not have the power to force 50 states to create the office of examining 
magistrate with a specific set of constitutionally-required duties. No, the Brady 
solution, like the Gideon solution, was all the Court could do. A cynic would say 
that both seminal Warren Court decisions make the pre-trial and trial process 
appear fairer without actually making them fairer. 
IV. MIRANDA, MIRANDA, WHEREFORE ART THOU, MIRANDA? 
So far, we have concluded that the Court’s 1960s idealism has given 
defendants and suspects an exclusionary rule “solution” to Fourth Amendment 
violations that can be avoided in myriad ways. The Court’s idealism has also given 
defendants a right to counsel that might not really change much in terms of the 
punishment delivered over the universe of indigent defendants, and a right to have 
the State disclose exculpatory evidence that probably does not actually produce 
much exculpatory evidence. What about our old friend, Miranda v. Arizona?92 This 
one is trickier to assess because what the Court sought to achieve in Miranda is 
not easy to discern. One reading, perhaps the most persuasive one, is that the Court 
wished to empower suspects to resist police interrogation if that was their 
preference. Much of the language in the opinion supports this reading: “We have 
concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation 
of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures 
which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak 
where he would not otherwise do so freely.”93 
The problem, as Seidman, Allen, and others have convincingly 
demonstrated,94 is that at the moment the suspect opens his mouth and says 
something, his preference was to speak. What does it mean to empower a suspect 
to speak “freely”? Wigmore was correct a century ago when he claimed that the 
notion of an involuntary or unfree confession is incoherent: “As between the rack 
and a false confession, the latter would usually be considered the less disagreeable; 
 
92.  384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
93.  Id. at 467. 
94.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71 (2006); Louis Michael 
Seidman, Rubashov’s Question: Self-Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced Preferences, 2 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 149, 174 (1990); George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Spider Web, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1215 (2017). 
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but it is nonetheless voluntarily chosen”95 All conscious choices are voluntarily 
made, even “your money or your life.” 
If the Miranda Court’s goal was merely to tell the suspect he need not talk and 
can consult with a lawyer,96 then we can conclude it has been enormously 
successful. The warnings seem sufficient to communicate those two ideas to 
almost all suspects: 
 
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right 
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in 
a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, 
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for 
him prior to any questioning if he so desires.97 
 
Few suspects would fail to understand these warnings. To be sure, a suspect 
might forget the warnings if he endures a lengthy interrogation. But I have 
difficulty believing the suspect who begins to answer police questions does so 
without knowing, at least as an abstract matter, that he does not have to answer. If 
this is right, and if Miranda’s purpose was merely to convey information to the 
suspect, then we can conclude it has been quite a success. 
But, the tenor of the Court’s opinion suggests that its goal was something more 
than ensuring a bare, abstract level of knowledge that a suspect need not talk to 
police. Both civil libertarians and crime control advocates read the opinion more 
broadly. Much of the opinion speaks of police interrogation as a shady, if not 
downright illegitimate, enterprise. Three quotes will suffice to make the point 
(though I could produce a dozen or more). 
 
It is important [for police interrogators] to keep the subject off 
balance, for example, by trading on his insecurity about himself 
or his surroundings. The police then persuade, trick, or cajole him 
out of exercising his constitutional rights. . . . 
 
Even without employing brutality, the "third degree" or the 
specific stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial 
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades 
on the weakness of individuals. . . . 
 
In the cases before us today, given this background, we concern 
ourselves primarily with this interrogation atmosphere and the 
 
95.  2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, § 824 (2d ed. 1923). 
96.  See George C. Thomas III, Separated at Birth But Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process 
Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2001). 
97.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 
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evils it can bring.98 
 
These broadsides against police interrogators suggest the Court sought to re-
order a suspect’s preferences so he would not want to talk to police. That reading 
is the one the Miranda dissents embraced. As Justice White put it in his dissent: 
 
The obvious underpinning of the Court's decision is a deep-seated 
distrust of all confessions. As the Court declares that the accused 
may not be interrogated without counsel present, absent a waiver 
of the right to counsel, and as the Court all but admonishes the 
lawyer to advise the accused to remain silent, the result adds up to 
a judicial judgment that evidence from the accused should not be 
used against him in any way, whether compelled or not. This is 
the not so subtle overtone of the opinion—that it is inherently 
wrong for the police to gather evidence from the accused 
himself.99 
 
But one might respond, as Justice White responded: why would that be an 
illegitimate goal? Why would the Court want to discourage guilty suspect from 
confessing? In White’s words: 
 
I see nothing wrong or immoral, and certainly nothing 
unconstitutional, in the police's asking a suspect whom they have 
reasonable cause to arrest whether or not he killed his wife or in 
confronting him with the evidence on which the arrest was based, 
at least where he has been plainly advised that he may remain 
completely silent.100 
 
Justice Harlan made the same point in his dissent: “Society has always paid a 
stiff price for law and order, and peaceful interrogation is not one of the dark 
moments of the law.”101 
If the Court’s goal in Miranda was to reorder preferences to make suspects 
more resistant to police interrogators, then it has been an abject failure. Though 
my friend Paul Cassell has argued for decades that Miranda has suppressed the 
rate at which police obtain confessions,102 the effect is at the margin, if it exists at 
 
98.  Id. at 455–56. 
99.  Id. at 538–39 (White, J., dissenting). 
100.  Id. at 539. 
101.  Id. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
102.  See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on 
Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 50 (1998); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social 
Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L REV. 90 (1996); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police 
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996). 
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all. Roughly 80% of suspects waive Miranda and talk (freely?) to police.103 While 
we do not know for sure how many suspects refused to talk to police prior to 
Miranda, it was roughly in the 20% range.104 So Miranda has, perhaps, stiffened 
the resolve, reordered the preferences, of a percent or two or three of suspects. 
And it is entirely possible (though Cassell does not see the world this way) that 
Miranda actually facilitates police efforts to get suspects to incriminate 
themselves. If the suspect expects the third degree, he might be inclined to say 
nothing, as suspects often did in the “bad old days” of the third degree. But today 
we have a friendly cop who tells you that you need not talk to him but, by the way, 
this is your last and best chance to tell your side of the story. Of course, police 
probably always stressed that suspects should tell their side of the story but the 
strategy is likely more effective after hearing the soothing warnings. 
Though the analogy is far from perfect, consider the interrogations of al-Qaeda 
detainees after 9/11. Special agent Ali Soufan claims that the use of nonthreatening 
techniques can confuse detainees and lead them to cooperate. “[E]ngaging and 
outwitting” detainees often proves more productive than coercion.105 “Cruel 
interrogation techniques not only serve to reinforce what a terrorist has been 
prepared to expect if captured; they give him a greater sense of control and 
predictability about his experience, and strengthen his resistance.”106 Soufan 
claims that he was quite successful in using these nonthreatening techniques in the 
wake of 9/11, but when the CIA began outsourcing interrogations to operatives 
who applied increasing levels of coercion (like waterboarding), the level of 
cooperation declined. 
Consider the interrogation of a murder suspect in Berghuis v. Thompkins.107 
Detective Helgert gave the suspect Miranda warnings and had him read the fifth 
warning aloud: “You have the right to decide at any time before or during 
questioning to use your right to remain silent and your right to talk with a lawyer 
while you are being questioned.”108 This is not part of the warnings the Miranda 
Court required but it strikes me as a good idea. Thompkins thus knew that he 
controlled whether and when to answer questions. 
 
About 2 hours and 45 minutes into the interrogation, Helgert asked 
Thompkins, “Do you believe in God?” Thompkins made eye 
contact with Helgert and said “Yes,” as his eyes “well[ed] up with 
 
103.  See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 102, at 839; Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 282–83 (1996); George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 1959 (2004). 
104.  See George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda A Real-World Failure: A Plea for More (and Better) Empirical 
Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996). 
105.  ALI H. SOUFAN, THE BLACK BANNERS: THE INSIDE STORY OF 9/11 AND THE WAR AGAINST AL-
QAEDA 423 (2011). 
106.  Id. 
107.  560 U.S. 370 (2010). 
108.  Id. at 375. 
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tears.” Helgert asked, “Do you pray to God?” Thompkins said 
“Yes.” Helgert asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for 
shooting that boy down?” Thompkins answered “Yes” and looked 
away. Thompkins refused to make a written confession, and the 
interrogation ended about 15 minutes later.109 
 
Though obviously I cannot prove it, I believe that had Helgert applied the third 
degree to Thompkins, without giving him Miranda warnings, Thompkins would 
not have responded to the questions about God. If that is right, Miranda laid the 
groundwork for the clever police interrogation strategy to succeed. Maybe 
Miranda is the clever police officer’s friend. 
V. REFORM GOING FORWARD 
The problem the Court faced in the 1960s was not just its idealism but most 
fundamentally the lack of a mechanism for making meaningful reforms in the four 
areas we have discussed. At least on the right to counsel, Dripps is not as 
pessimistic as I am. He posits the possibility of a second revolution in the Court’s 
criminal procedure that would require judicial supervision of plea bargaining 
where trial courts could “refuse[] to enter a plea absent a record of factual 
investigation and sound legal advice by counsel.”110 I do not see this happening in 
the lifetime of anyone reading this essay. Of course, as Dripps realizes, by itself 
this would be an insufficient solution to the counsel problem. As long as 
prosecutors can up the ante by charging multiple offenses that have long prison 
sentences, the defendant is not likely to benefit much from counsel. Thus, the 
second revolution would have to include reading the Eighth Amendment to 
drastically limit the power of legislatures to create draconian punishment schemes, 
and the Double Jeopardy Clause to forbid prosecutors to charge multiple offenses 
out of a single course of criminal conduct. This seems even less likely to me. 
Dripps also posits the possibility of a legislative solution, recommending 
various reform proposals. The problem here is that it is a 50 state process. So far, 
some 25 years after it became clear that innocent defendants were being 
convicted,111 no state has addressed that problem with a comprehensive revision 
of its criminal procedure designed to protect innocent suspects and defendants.112 
 
109.  Id. at 376. 
110.  Dripps, supra note 7, at 918. 
111.  See, e.g., Edward Connors, et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the 
Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (1996). 
112.  To be sure, there have been beneficial piece-meal revisions of state procedures in a handful of states. 
See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011) (eyewitness identifications); Robert P. Mosteller, N.C. 
Inquiry Commission’s First Decade: Impressive Successes and Lessons Learned, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1725 (2016) 
(discussing several North Carolina reform ideas in addition to eyewitness identification); Christine C. Mumma, 
The North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon Perspectives Joined By a Common Cause, 52 
DRAKE L. REV. 647, 654 (2003) (same). 
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Why start now? 
One of my students suggested that Congress could force the needed legal 
machinery on all 50 states, either directly or by creating incentives for states to do 
so. The first problem, of course, is that Congress in modern times cannot agree on 
what day of the week it is, let alone pass meaningful legislation. But passing that 
problem, and assuming the miracle of a functioning Congress, I very much doubt 
the Constitution permits Congress to dictate to the states a code of criminal 
procedure. I see nothing in Article I, section 8 that could be stretched to justify 
forcing the states to follow a standard criminal procedure.113 
Could it achieve the same goal by making federal criminal justice funding 
contingent on states adopting a reform-minded comprehensive criminal code? The 
problem here is two-fold. First, creating effective counsel requires reworking not 
only state criminal procedure but also the substantive criminal law. I doubt states 
receive enough federal criminal justice funding to persuade them to undertake that 
gargantuan task. Second, all four reforms (putting teeth into Miranda and the 
Fourth Amendment, and strengthening the role of counsel and right to exculpatory 
evidence) will result in fewer convictions. While some of these will be factually 
innocent defendants, many will be guilty. So ,Congress is going to tell all 50 states 
to completely rework their substantive criminal law and their criminal procedure 
to let more guilty defendants go free or lose X dollars in federal criminal justice 
funding? My bet is that almost all states will tell Congress to keep its criminal 
justice funding. 
Even if we had a second criminal procedure revolution or a sudden willingness 
of states to change their criminal procedure and substantive criminal law, the 
Fourth Amendment problem seems insoluble to me. I thought about requiring 
search warrants for all searches except incident to arrest, but this depends on judges 
reading affidavits with care and rejecting warrants based on thin probable cause. 
Available evidence suggests this is another example of starry-eyed idealism.114 The 
tort remedy appears to have worked well as a deterrent of over-zealous policing in 
colonial days and our first century as a nation. But that was because Americans in 
those times valued privacy and autonomy more than they feared crime. I do not 
believe that to be true today. Colonial juries came to the defense of printers and 
publishers, but would juries today really give murderers a tort judgment because 
the police used the wrong search warrant form? Color me extremely doubtful. So 
maybe there is no solution to the Fourth Amendment problem. Police will cut 
corners to solve serious crimes and courts will bend the rules in many cases to 
convict dangerous criminals. Maybe that is not a bad problem.115 
 
113.  See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
114.  The National Center for State Courts reported in one city studied, the average length of magisterial 
review was a mere two minutes and forty-eight seconds; ten percent of the warrant applications were approved in 
less than one minute. RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, 
PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 31 (1984). 
115.  To be sure, too much bending of the rules can lead to the conviction of the innocent, but the latest 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
We have examined four Warren Court attempts to reform the criminal process 
to give more power and control to suspects and defendants. And we have four more 
or less failures. What lesson should we learn from this experiment? 
The first lesson is that the Warren Court, indulging its 1960s idealism, put far 
too much faith in the willingness of relevant actors in the criminal justice system 
to apply in a meaningful way the solutions the Court created. Could the Court have 
done more? If the Court in 1966, for example, thought police were tricking or 
cajoling too many incriminating statements from suspects, the answer was not 
Miranda warnings that, it turns out, were ineffective in stiffening the resolve of 
suspects to resist police interrogation. No, the solution was to hold that all 
statements made in response to police interrogation were compelled and 
inadmissible. Period. 
There are two problems with that solution. First, the politics would have been 
ugly. It seems unlikely that Warren could have gotten four other votes for what 
would have amounted to the abolition of police interrogation. The reaction to 
Miranda in the country and the Congress was intensely hostile.116 The reaction to 
abolition of interrogation would have been far worse. But the more fundamental 
problem is that abolition of police interrogation runs directly contrary to the 1960s 
liberal agenda that believed in empowering, not denying, choice. To take away a 
suspect’s ability to cooperate with the police would have stood liberal ideology of 
the time on its head. 
The Warren Court saw four severe problems with state criminal justice in the 
1960s. The Court tried to fix the problems. It largely failed. Can we do better? 
Don’t hold your breath. 
And what of the Brown v. Board of Education revolution followed by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964? Here is a small piece of discouraging data. In 1973, the Court 
ruled that federal courts could order desegregation remedies in schools outside the 
South if courts found that official actions had kept a substantial part of a school 
system racially segregated.117 One potential court-ordered remedy was busing. 
There was much political opposition to forced busing, particularly in the 
Northeast.118 Government data show that the percentage of African-American 
students in what it calls “intensely segregated minority schools” in the Northeast 
steadily rose from about 42% in 1973 to about 50% in 1991 and has stayed about 
the same since.119 Even with the wind of Brown at their back, courts could not keep 
 
the Innocents Gone?, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 865 (2018) (estimating rate of convictions of innocent defendants at 1/8% 
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118.  See, e.g., MATTHEW F. DELMONT, WHY BUSING FAILED: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE NATIONAL 
RESISTANCE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (2016). 
119.  Gary Orfield, et al., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT 
2020 / The Warren Court, Idealism, and the 1960s 
866 
school segregation from growing worse in the Northeast. 
Courts can, perhaps, help improve society at the margin. But, in the main, 
America will have the legal world it chooses through its legislatures. Justice 
Holmes,120 Justice Brandeis,121 Justice Frankfurter,122 Justice Harlan,123 and Justice 
Scalia,124 to name five deep thinkers, would agree. Should we? Up to you. 
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